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RECENT DECISIONS
vacate judgments where the error complained of was one of law
apparent on the record. 2
1
In the present case the Court states that even though the defen-
dant was ignorant of the indictment's insufficiency it does not follow
that he did not intelligently waive his right to counsel. The Court
reasoned that since the prosecution and the lower court failed to
notice the defect in the indictment, it must remain wholly in the field
of speculation as to whether assigned counsel would have done so.22
Nevertheless, even if such a presumption could be made in the de-
fendant's favor relief could not be granted in this proceeding since
the error was one of law apparent on the record.
While at first glance the decision may seem harsh, other rem-
edies are available to the defendant. 23 The writ of error coram nobis
was intended to provide a means of relief where formerly none had
existed, i.e., to relieve against errors of fact unknown at the trial.
It is applicable only where no other remedy is available.2 4
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to prescribe the exact limits
of coram nobis. However, in determining whether the remedy may
be invoked, it is well to remember the history and purpose of the
writ lest it become merely a substitute for appeal and other available
remedies.
EMINENT DOMAIN-ESTABLISHMENT OF Bus STOPS BY CITY
HELD NOT A COMPENSABLE TAKING OF ABUTTING OWNER'S RIGHT
OF AccEss.-Plaintiffs, gas station owners, sought to enjoin the City
of New York from establishing bus stops, terminals, and turn-around
points fronting on their driveways, and asked damages for this al-
legedly serious impairment of their easements of access. The Court
the error appears on the face of the record... ." Id. at 202, 144 N.E.2d at
11, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
21 People v. Johnson, 10 Misc. 2d 103, 172 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Dutchess County
Ct. 1958); People v. Waterman, 5 App. Div. 2d 717, 168 N.Y.S.2d 819 (3d
Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision) (dictum); People v. Langford, 4 App.
Div. 2d 919, 166 N.Y.S.2d 933 (3d Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision)(dictum).22 It would appear that the court presumes a doefense counsel may very
well be negligent. But cf. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E.
88 (1926).
23 Errors of law committed by a lower court are subject to attack by a
motion for a new trial, an appeal or other statutory remedy for which coram
nobis is not a substitute. See Taylor v. United States, 177 F.2d 194 (4th Cir.
1949); People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 232 Pac. 457, 460 (1924).
24 FRANx, CoRAm NoBis 3.02 (1953) ; Note, Ci rrent Treatment of Coram
Nobis in Federal and New York Courts, 33 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 98, 105 (1958).
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held this to be a minor and intermittent interference, insufficient to
constitute a compensable taking of property. Cities Serv. Oil Co.
v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d 814, 180 N.Y.S.2d
769 (1958).
An abutting owner's easements of access to public streets have
long been recognized in the courts of New York.1 Where these
rights are assumed, as in the present case, and the final question in-
volves the degree of interference with the right of access, 2 the courts
have used various standards in granting compensation.
Where the use of the street is not foreseeable, normal, ordinary,
and consistent with the purpose of the street,3 or where there is an
obstruction of benefit to private parties only and not to the public, 4
the courts have granted compensation to abutting owners on the
theory that such use breaches an implied contract between city
and owner that the streets shall not be so used.5 Mere authorization
of the obstruction by the city, moreover, does not make the inter-
ference ordinary or reasonable. 6
The New York courts have also used, in addition to consistency
with "street use," theories of nuisance 7 and continuing trespass 8 in
1Kane v. New York Elev. R.R., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891);
Lahr v. Metropolitan Elev. Ry., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1887); Story
v. New York Elev. R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882). These "elevated railroad"
cases went far to protect the rights of abutting owners.
2 "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Whether a regu-
lation does go too far is a "question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed
of by general propositions ... " Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
3 Matter of Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 197 N.Y. 81, 90 N.E. 456(1909) ; Kane v. New York Elev. R.R., supra note 1. Erection of a wall to
support a double-deck highway is not a street use. Matter of City of New
York (East River Drive), 298 N.Y. 843, 84 N.E.2d 148 (1949) (memorandum
decision). Subways are not street uses, but municipal uses. "Business" enter-
prises by the city belong to the city as proprietor, not as sovereign, and nor-
mally are not street uses. Matter of Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, sukra.
4 Bradley v. Degnon Constr. Co., 224 N.Y. 60, 120 N.E. 89 (1918) ; Rigney
v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 217 N.Y. 31, 111 N.E. 226 (1916).
5 Kane v. New York Elev. R.R., supra note 1. New York courts express
the abutter's rights in terms of contract and trust rather than title. Thus,
title to the streets may be held in trust for public use, or under a contract
with the abutting owner. Ackermann v. True, 175 N.Y. 353, 67 N.E. 629
(1903).
6 The city has the °obligation of compensation which cannot be done
away with by authorization. Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197
U.S. 544 (1905); Manhattan R.R. v. Mayor, 89 Hun 429, 35 N.Y. Supp.
505 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
7 See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932);
Sammons v. City of Gloversville, 175 N.Y. 346, 67 N.E. 622 (1903).
8 Vanton Corp. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 177 N.Y. 93, 13 N.E.2d




determining whether compensation shall be given to an owner.
In some cases, any material obstruction, serious delay or unreason-
able incumbrance has been held a taking.9 But in the absence of
these, other inconveniences or nuisances have been held to be damnum
absque injuria, to be borne by the owner without compensation.10
The courts in many decisions have emphasized questions of
policy. Some considerations here are public benefit and convenience,"
public rights,' 2 and necessity.' 3  But while adhering to the concept
of a proper balance between ptablic welfare and the owner's rights,
the courts have nevertheless granted compensation where the con-
templated use is inconsistent with the scheme and purpose of the
street and its use as a whole.
14
Application of all the above theories is dependent on softie test
of the degree of the obstruction. The court weighs, for instance,
the nature and type of the interference in itself in determining whether
it is of such a nature as to be compensable.' 3 Where the obstruction
0 See, e.g., Kane v. New York Elev. R.R., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278
(1891); Story v. New York Elev. R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882).
10 Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), aff'd,
206 U.S. 536 (1907).
11 "Public benefit" must conform to the purpose of the street, Matter of
Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 197 N.Y. 81, 90 N.E. 456 (1909), and be limited
by the wisdom of the legislature, 2 COOLEY, CONsTITUTIoNAL LImiTATIONs
1129 (8th ed. 1927). But see Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y.
222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). "[The State] may not take private property
without compensation even for a public purpose and to advance the general
welfare." Id. at 231, 15 N.E.2d at 591. (Emphasis added.)
12 Compare Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N.Y. 475, 483-84, 68 N.E.
880, 882 (1903) (the public right to the use of the streets is absolute and
paramount to any other), with. Matter of Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 197
N.Y. 81, 90 N.E. 456 (1909) (abutter, as member of public, cannot be in-jured to benefit others).
13 "The interference must be not unreasonable . . . [and] must be kept
within the limits of necessity." Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278
N.Y. 222, 230, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1938). In Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v.
City of Mt. Vernon, 282 App. Div. 890, 125 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dep't 1953)
(memorandum decisiort), an acute need for a public parking area could not
prevail over plaintiff's rights. A taking in the guise of regulation cannot be
done even for a public purpose. "The moment the appropriation goes beyond
the necessity of the case', it ceases to be justified on the principles which
underlie the right of eminent domain." 2 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LimTA-
TiONS 1147 (8th ed. 1927).14 Bradley v. Degnon Constr. Co., 224 N.Y. 60, 120 N.E. 89 (1918);
Matter of Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 197 N.Y. 81, 90 N.E. 456 (1909);
cases cited note 1 supra.
'r Caldwell & Ward Brass Co. v. State, 277 N.Y. 547, 13 N.E.2d 467
(1938) (permanent retaining wall); Thompson v. Orange & Rockland Elec.
Co., 254 N.Y. 366, 173 N.E. 224 (1930) (power lines); Bradley v. Degnon
Constr. Co., 224 N.Y. 60, 120 N.E. 89 (1918) (street railway); Waldorf-
Astoria Hotel Co. v. City of New York, 212 N.Y. 97, 105 N.E. 803 (1914)(hack stands); Hawk & Wetherbee v. Gaynor, 211 N.Y. 598, 105 N.E. 1086
(1914) (memorandum decision) (hack stands).
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is absolute and permanent or excessive and unreasonable, 16 the courts
have recognized a taking of property to an appreciable degree 17 and
have awarded compensation. In this area a constantly changing con-
cept of reasonableness is used, based partly on the public policy con-
siderations set forth above. Obstructions have been characterized
in some cases as material, and compensation therefore awarded;
similar obstructions in other cases have been dismissed as minor and
intermittent.' 8
In Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co. v. City of New York,'" establish-
ment of taxi stands in front of plaintiff's property was held reasonable
under the above standards, because the presence of the cabs was
intermittent and not permanent, and did not interfere with the plain-
tiff's right of access. The court, however, intimated that if the inter-
ference was unreasonable, compensation would have been granted.
The court used the standard of reasonableness "founded upon some
rational distinction having a real basis in the state of things to be
dealt with." 20
" In the general area of eminent domain, equitable questions of
unnecessary and substantial damage, special injury or hardship,
diminution of property values, irreparability of harm, damages to
business, and unreasonable delays and incumbrances have been
weighed by the court.21  In cases of obstruction to property, the
courts have considered the type of property obstructed, 22 and the
16 "What is reasonable is in large part tested by what is ordinary usage
and common experience . . . in these days when, as we all know, very exact
rules are adopted to govern motor traffic in congested centers .... ." Com-
missioners of Palisades Interstate Park v. Lent, 240 N.Y. 1, 8, 147 N.E. 228,
230 (1925). Intervals of from 5 to 30 minutes up to one hour of truck park-
ing to unload merchandise have been held unreasonable. Western Auto Supply
Co. v. Koming Tire Co., 48 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
17 "The Courts have not hesitated to declare statutes invalid wherever
regulation has gone so far that it is clearly unreasonable and must be 'recog-
nized as taking' . . . ." Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, supra note 13,
at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 591. See also 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIiTATIoNs
1119-20, 1120 n.2 (8th ed. 1927).
18 Compare Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. Z7, 72 N.E. 579 (1904),
aff'd, 206 U.S. 537 (1907), with Matter of City of New York (East River
Drive), 298 N.Y. 843, 84 N.E.2d 148 (1949) (memorandum decision). A
similar distinction is made between temporary and permanent obstructions.
Coffey v. State, 291 N.Y. 494, 53 N.E.2d 362 (1944).19212 N.Y. 97, 105 N.E. 803 (1914).20 Id. at 107, 105 N.E. at 806.
21 Matter of Bd. of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789 (1938);
Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1938) ; Matter
of City of New York (W. 10th St.), 267 N.Y. 212, 196 N.E. 30 (1935);
Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412 (1931) ; Waldorf-Astoria Hotel
Co. v. City of New York, 212 N.Y. 97, 105 N.E. 803 (1914); Sammons v.
City of Gloversville, 175 N.Y. 346, 67 N.E. 622 (1903). Private enterprise
is indirectly for the benefit of the city, and the city should not act to dis-
courage it.
22 See Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co. v. City of New York, supra note 21.
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extent of the impairment of access-its length in time and its loca-
tion.23 Final considerations include sanction by precedent, which the
court will follow whenever practicable, and gross injustice,2 4 which
the court will prevent whenever possible.
In the principal case, plaintiff's rights of access were impaired
by bus stops, bus terminals, and bus turn-arounds on all his frontage.
The facts indicate that during rush hours and at red lights on both
the abutting streets buses would normally tend to "double-up" at
both stops and wait for various periods of time. 25  Although the
Court found that the bus schedules and waiting periods did not con-
stitute a major interference, the basis of the final decision was one
of public policy. But policy considerations alone are purely arbitrary
unless based on reasonable inferences from fact and connections with
other theories, and the Court could have found on several of the above
theories that the obstruction here justly warranted compensation.
Whether this was a reasonable and foreseeable use of the street
might have been considered in the light of the establishment not only
of bus stops, but bus terminals and turn-around points. Similarly,
in cofisidering whether public policy outweighs damage to the owner,
there should be a reasonable balance of convenience and hardship.
Although the Court found from the facts that this was a minor and
intermittent interference, not permanent in nature, it must be noted
that "minor" and "intermittent" interferences can sometimes be even
more effective than "permanent" ones in destroying or seriously dam-
aging an abutting owner's access. 26 While the Court may be re-
luctant to grant compensation in every area of eminent domain, the
obvious hardships present in the instant case would suggest a more
equitable definition of what constitutes "reasonable interference" in
cases of this nature.
23 In Farrell v. Rose, 253 N.Y. 73, 170 N.E. 498 (1930), an obstruction
barring plaintiff's access for 147 days longer than the date specified in a city
contract was held reasonable.
4 Kane v. New York Elev. R.R., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891). "The
standard of what experience has proved to be convenient in the past, in order
to afford free and ample ingress and egress . . . furnishes a ready test of
what constitutes a reasonable exercise of power .... " Waldorf-Astoria Hotel
Co. v. City of New York, 212 N.Y. 97, 107, 105 N.E. 803, 806 (1914).
25 Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 114, 154 N.E.2d
814, 815, 180 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (1958).
26 Elevated railroad pillars, while permanent, would afford access between
them to property below, Kane v. New York Elev. R.R., supra note 24, while
the presence of standing buses, although not permanent, would be a continuing
intermittent interference with all the owner's frontage. See Cities Serv. Oil
Co. v. City of New York, supra note 25. The "elevated railroad" cases were
not decided on the ground of permanence, but on "inconsistency with street
use," together with hardship and the owner's rights. A similar test for surface
interferences, rather than public policy alone, would seem to have been more
reasonable in the present case.
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